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ver  the 40 years since  the Great  Depres- 
sion, economists have developed a variety 
of  theories to explain  the phenomenon  of  un- 
employment.  Many  of  these  explanations  are 
products of  their  time, emerging  as the result 
'of  major  social  and  economic  developments. 
Yet, all such  models have at least one thing in 
common.  They  represent  attempts  by  their 
proponents to provide a theoretical framework 
within which policy prescriptions can be devel- 
oped. 
This article  examines  four  recent  theoreti- 
cal explanations for the problem of  unemploy- 
ment: the theory  of  structural  unemployment, 
the job-search, labor-turnover  theory, the the- 
ory  of human capital, and the dual labor mar- 
ket  hypothesis.  These  alternative  approaches 
are  examined  with  particular  emphasis  on 
their respective views  of  the structure and be- 
havior of  the labor  market, and especially, on 
the  policy  prescriptions  which  follow  from 
these different views. 
lNADEQUABE DEMAND OR STRUCTURAL 
UNEMPLOYMENT? 
Given the experience of  the Great Depres- 
sion,  there  has  understandably  been  much 
interest in  diagnosing  the causes of  unemploy- 
ment.  From a  policy standpoint, however, the 
more important  question  is  why  workers who 
lose their jobs are not quickly reemployed, and 
why  many new  entrants or reentrants to the la- 
bor  force  remain  without  jobs.  As  noted  by 
Gilpatrick,  if  reemployment  is  assured,  the 
reasons  for  the original  unemployment  are of 
little  interest.  Thus, "the  causes  blocking  re- 
employment  are  the  proper  targets  for 
policy."' 
One  long-standing  controversy  over  the 
persistence of  unemployment  developed in  the 
late 1950's  and  early  1960's  between  the ad- 
vocates  of  inadequate  aggregate  demand  the- 
ory and the proponents of  the school of  struc- 
tural unemployment. This controversy arose at 
a  time when  the national  unemployment  rate 
seemed  to  lose  its  resiliency.  From  1951 
through  1957,  the unemployment  rate exceed- 
ed  5  per  cent  of  the labor  force  only  in  one 
year,  1954. Then,  after  reaching  its  recession 
high  of  6.8  per  cent  in  1958,  the  unemploy- 
ment  rate did  not  fall  below  5  per  cent  for 
7 years. 
In  1961,  the  Joint  Economic  Committee 
conducted a series of hearings2  to try to deter- 
mine whether  structural factors or inadequate 
I/Eleanor  G. Gilpatrick, Structural  Unemployment  and  Aggre- 
gate Demand(Ba1timore:  Johns Hopkins Press. 1966). p. 2. 
2/U. S. Congress, Joint  Economic Committee,  Subcommittee  on 
Economic  Statistics,  Higher  Unemployment  Rates.  195740: 
Struc~ural  Trans$ormation  or Inadequate  Demand, 87th Congress. 
1st  Session  (Washington:  U. S. Government  Printing  Office, 
1961). 
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demand  were  responsible  for  the  high  unem- 
ployment  the  country  had  been  experiencing 
since the closing  months of  1957. The distinc- 
tion  between  these  two  explanations  for  the 
persistence of  unemployment appeared crucial 
from the viewpoint of policy. The advocates of 
the  inadequate demand  theory,  most  notably 
Walter Heller, then chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisors,  tended  to dismiss  the sig- 
nificance  of  structural  unemployment.  They 
argued  instead  that  the  persistently  high  un- 
employment was due to the incomplete recov- 
ery  from  the  1957-58  recession.  The solution 
therefore lay in  more expansionary  fiscal  poli- 
cies  such  as  lower  taxes  and  greater  govern- 
ment spending. 
The  structuralists,  on  the  other  hand, 
viewed  the  unemployment  as  arising  from  a 
change  in  the  composition  of  labor  skill  re- 
quirements  relative to labor  skill  availability. 
They  argued  that  this  structural  mismatch 
could  arise in  several  ways,  regardless  of  the 
level of  aggregate demand. For example, tech- 
nology  may  change,  the  demand  for  certain 
products may disappear, raw materials may be 
used  up  in  a given  geographic area, a  factory 
or industry may change its location, or the pro- 
portion of different skill groups in  the popula- 
tion may change over time. 
As long as the labor force is able to adapt 
to  these  changes,  said  the  structuralists,  no 
problem  exists.  But  if  people are unwilling or 
unable to move to a different  geographic area 
where workers  with their  qualifications  are in 
demand,  if  their  skills  have  become obsolete, 
or if their skills are of limited transferability and 
their  numbers in  the labor force increase with- 
out  a  concommitant  increase  in  the  demand 
for  their  services,  structural  unemployment  is 
the result.' 
Arguing that a combination of these devel- 
opments  was  at  the  root  of  the  persistently 
high  unemployment, the structuralists claimed 
that a  policy  of  adapting  the unemployed  to 
available  job  openings would substantially  re- 
duce  the  unemployment  rate  at  the  current 
level  of  national  income.  Because  they  be- 
lieved  the problem  to be structural  in  nature, 
they further claimed that an attempt to reduce 
the  unemployment  through  increasing  aggre- 
gate demand would succeed only at the cost of 
substantial inflation as bottlenecks a~peared.~ 
Following  extensive  debate,  the  inade- 
quate  demand  view  prevailed  in  Washington, 
and the 1964 income tax cut was passed in  an. 
attempt to stimulate demand. This provided a 
test  of  these  two  alternative  theories  which 
seemed  to  substantiate  the  inadequate  de- 
mand  position.  In  1965,  the  unemployment 
rate fell  below  5 per  cent  and  then  remained 
below  4  per  cent  from  1966  to  1969.j Never- 
theless,  a  great  deal  of  interesting  work  has 
been done on  the concept of structural  unem- 
ployment,  and  it  remains  a  potentially  useful 
tool  for  explaining certain  occurrences  of  un- 
employment,  especially  when  the economy  is 
functioning  much  closer  to  full  employment 
than was the case in  the late 1950's  and early 
1960'~.~ 
SOME NEW  AIBWEOWOES  OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
Since  the  structuralist-inadequate  demand 
controversy  of  the  early  1960's,  economists 
3/Gilpatrick,  pp.  4-5.  Also  Barbara  R. Bergrnann  and  David  E. 
Kaun,  Structural  Unemployment  in  the  United  States. U.  S. DF- 
partment  of  Commerce (Washington:  U. S. Government  Printing 
Office, 1966), pp. 4-5. 
The classic example of  workers'  unwillingness to move  to an- 
other  geographic  area  is  the case  of  unemployed  coal  miners  in 
Appalachia  in  the 1950's  and  1960's. Similarly,  railroad firemen 
represent  persons  whose  skills  have  become  obsolete,  while  mi- 
nority  teenagers,  with  skills  of  limited  transferability,  have  in- 
creased their labor supply  in  excess of  the increase in  the demand 
for their services. 
4/Richard  Perlman,  Labor  Theory  (New  York:  John  Wiley and 
Sons.  1969), p. 167. 
5/Besides the tax cut, spending for the Vietnam  war greatly stimu- 
lated  the economy  during  these years.  While the  resulting  fall  in 
unemployment  supports  the  view  that  demand  had  been  inade- 
quate, the accompanying  climb in  the rate of inflation,  to a level 
consistently  above 3  per cent since 1966, points to the existence of 
inflationary  bottlenecks which arise  when  the economy is  subject- 
ed to too rapid a rate of expansion. 
6/Gilpatrick,  Structural  Unemployment and  Aggregate  Demand. 
and especially  Perlman,  Labor  Theory, ch. 7, present strong evi- 
dence of the existence  of  structural unemployment and argue con- 
vincingly that "much of  the  confusion  in  evaluating the impact of 
structural  aspects  has  resulted  from  illogical  or  loose  definitions 
of theterm .  . .". 
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have generally  agreed about the cause  of the 
increase  in  unemployment  and  its  persistence 
during  and  following  a  recession. The  reces- 
sionary  falloff  in  the demand  for  goods  and 
services  leads  to a  rise  in  the unemployment 
rate, while  the uncertainty  of  a  recovery,  the 
increased  productivity  of  those  already  em- 
ployed,  and  the knowledge  of  the availability 
of  a pool of unemployed  workers delays rehir- 
ing once the economy  begins to turn  around. 
Yet  even  when  the economy  was  functioning 
near  the limits  of  its  capacity, as in  the late 
19601s, the  overall  unemployment  rate  still 
hovered  just  below  4  per  cent  of  the  labor 
force, while for some population groups, it was 
considerably higher. 
Observing this phenomenon, several econo- 
mists  attempted  to answer  what  has  become 
a  central  question  in  current  unemployment 
theory:  "Why  is  the  unemployment  rate  so 
high  at  full  empl~yrnent?"~  Three  important 
theories which  deal  directly with this question 
are,  respectively,  the  job-search,  labor-turn- 
over theory; the theory of  human capital; and 
the dual labor market hypothesis. 
The notion of the level of "full employment 
unemployment" is  not  unambiguous.  One ap- 
proach suggests that the level of "full employ- 
ment unemployment" in  the United States is a 
rate of  unemployment  (say, 4  to 5  per  cent) 
which, if  maintained  permanently,  is compati- 
ble  with  some steady  rate of  inflation (say,  3 
to 4  per  cent  per  year).s  When  the economy 
is  operating  at  full  employment  (as  defined 
in  this  way),  an  increase  in  aggregate  de- 
mand  can  lower  the  unemployment  rate  fur- 
ther,  but  only  at  the  expense  of  higher  and 
higher rates of inflation. The question that the 
various  theories  of  unemployment  must  deal 
with is why the full employment level of unem- 
ployment (resulting  in  a  steady  and  relatively 
low  rate of  inflation)  is  reached  at so  high  a 
rate of unemployment. 
The Job-Search, Labor-Turnover Theory 
Of the three theories of unemployment not- 
ed, the formal search-turnover model  most di- 
rectly  draws  a functional  relationship  between 
unemployment  and  inflati~n.~  Characterized 
as "a  rigorous  theoretical  development  of  the 
traditional  notions  of  frictional  unemploy- 
ment,"1°  the  search-turnover  theory  views 
unemployment  as  the result  of  a  search  pro- 
cess,  where  both  employers and  workers have 
limited information about the opportunities  in 
the  labor  market. According  to this explana- 
tion, when a worker begins looking for a job, 
either  from a state of  nonparticipation  or pre- 
vious  employment,  it  is  generally  not  in  his 
economic  interest  to take  the  first  available 
position. Lacking basic information on the op- 
portunities in  the labor market, the worker in- 
stead searches for information on the types of 
jobs,  level  of  wages,  and  working  conditions 
available  to a  person of  his qualifications.  He 
therefore spends time unemployed  while learn- 
ing  about  jobs  and  waiting  for  better  job 
offers. 
Thus, according to the search-turnover the- 
ory, unemployment represents a type of invest- 
ment  by  workers  in  obtaining  information 
about  the labor  market.  Unemployment  per- 
sists because the labor  market is inefficient in 
providing  this  information  and  thus  fails  to 
quickly match workers and job vacancies. Tak- 
ing  the existing  patterns  of  labor  supply  and 
demand as given, the proponents of this theory 
suggest  that  unemployment  can  be  substan- 
7/This  is the title of a study by  Robert E. Hall. "Why Is The Un- 
employment  Rate So High  At  Full Employment?" Brookings Pa- 
pers on Economic Activity (No.  3: 1970). pp. 369-402. 
8 ,(  Hall  ,,  "Why  - . . .", p. 370. It  has been suggested that because of a 
c  anglng age sex composition  of the labor force, the trade-off  be- 
tween  the  rates  of  unemployment  and  inflation  may  actually  be 
worsening over time. See George L. Perry, "Changing Labor Mar- 
kets and  Inflation." Brookings Papers on  Economic Activity (No. 
3: 1970). pp.41141. 
9/See.  for  example,  Charles  Holt  and  Associates,  "Manpower 
Proposals  for Phase 111,"  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 
(No.  3: 1971). pp. 703-22. 
IO/Roberl  E.  Hall, "Prospects  for  Shifting  the  Phillips  Curve 
Through Manpower Policies," Brookings Papers on Economic Ac- 
tivity  (No. 3:  1971),  p.  660.  Frictional  unemployment  is  tem- 
porary  unemployment  which arises  due  to  the  time  required  for 
finding or changing jobs. 
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tially  reduced  through  a  comprehensive  pro- 
gram of  manpower policies. In particular, this 
would  include a  several-fold  expansion  in  the 
Federal-State Employment Service to improve 
the  quality  and  speed  of  worker-job  matches 
and  to reduce  turnover;  improved  vocational 
counseling  and  expanded  job  opportunities 
for  youth  to  reduce  their  high  turnover  and 
to  increase  their  future  productivity;  training 
and  job  restructuring  to  reduce  skill  short- 
ages  in  certain  occupations;  support  of  geo- 
graphic  mobility  to  reduce  pockets  of  high 
unemployment  while  good  jobs  remain  un- 
filled  elsewhere;  and  elimination  of  institu- 
tional  barriers,  such  as  union  restrictions  on 
entry  and  occupational  licensing,  which  in- 
crease  unemployment  by  reducing  the  effi- 
ciency of search. All of these policies are based 
on the belief that an improvement  in the infla- 
tion-unemployment  trade-off  can  only  be 
achieved by  reducing the "frictions" within the 
labor  market  and  thereby  improving  its  effi- 
ciency.! ' 
There is  much  to be said  for  this  view  of 
the labor market with its emphasis on turnover 
as  the  principal  element  in  unemployment. 
Data on the duration of  unemployment in  the 
United States indicate clearly that the Keynes- 
ian  view-that  high  unemployment  is  caused 
by  the long-term inability of some fraction  of 
the labor  force  to find jobs-is  invalid  in  the 
modern  U.S. economy  when  it  is  functioning 
near "full-employment." Instead, the high  un- 
employment  rates  are the  result  of  frequent, 
generally short spells of unemployment.12 
Nevertheless,  Hall  and  other  economists 
find  fault  with  the  implicit  premise  of  the 
search  theorists  that "every  person  who  finds 
himself  out  of  work  is  spending a  few  weeks 
between jobs in  the normal advancement of his 
career."13 This, they feel, incorrectly represents 
the  labor  market  situation  of  teenagers,  of 
women, and, in  particular, of the unskilled and 
uneducated segments of the labor force. 
The  central  problem  seems  to  be  that 
some groups in  the labor  force have rates of 
unemployment  that  are  far  in  excess  of the 
rates  that  would  accord  with  the hypothesis 
that  the  unemployed  are  making  a  normal 
transition  from  one  job  to  another.  Some 
groups exhibit what seems to be a pathologi- 
cal instability in holding jobs.14 
Both  the theory of  human capital and the 
dual  labor  market  hypothesis  represent  at- 
tempts  to explain  this  seemingly  pathological 
job  instability.  Yet,  because  they  represent 
very  differenj  viewpoints  as to the  nature of 
the problem, their respective analyses and pol- 
icy prescriptions differ greatly. 
The Theory of Human Capital 
In many respects, the theory of human cap- 
ital is simply a logical extension of the underly- 
ing  assumptions  about  human  behavior  on 
which  most  of  modern  economic  theory  is 
based.  According  to  these  assumptions,  eco- 
nomic man  is  rational man, and all of  his de- 
cisions  are based  on  deliberate economic cal- 
culations. 
The theory  of  human  capital  extends  this 
II/HO~~,  "Manpower Proposals . . .", pp. 712-16.  Along the lines  Concept  to the determination  of  the  distribu- 
olthe first of these proposals, the U.  S.  Manpower Administration 
has  recently  initiated  a  15-state,  Federally  funded  pilot  program  of income and  Emphasiz- 
designed  to encoura e  both  employers  and  employees  to register  ing  individual  choice,  this  theory  concludes 
their manpower nee& and skills with  their state office of employ- 
ment  security.  Missouri is one of the participants in  this  project.  that  the  existing  distribution  of  income  and 
Dale Leibach, "Program To Match Jobs To People," Kansas City 
Times,  JUIY I  I, 1975.  unemployment  reflects  differences  in  the lev- 
12/Hall, "Prospects . . .",  p. 660. Also see Hall, "Turnover in the  els  of education and training, which, in turn,  Labor  Force,"  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity  (No. 3: 
1972). pp.  709-56  and  Steven  P.  Zell,  A  Comparative  Study of  are the direct result of decisions by  individuals 
the  Labor  Market  Characteristics  of  Return Migrants  and  Non- 
Mi~rants  in  Puerto  Rico (Commonwealth  of Puerto  Rico. Puerto 
~ico  Planning  Board,  ~ureau  of Social  Analysis,  1974); chs.  6  13/Hall, "Why. . .", p. 389. 
and 8.  14/lbid. 
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whether or not to invest in  themselves.ls From 
this premise it  follows that the unemployment 
problem  of  disadvantaged  workers  is  a  prob- 
lem  on  the supply side rather than on the de- 
mand  side  of  the  labor  market. That  is,  be- 
cause these  workers lack  the basic  skills  nec- 
essary to make it worthwhile for employers to 
hire them at the prevailing level of wages, the 
amount of  labor they  are willing to supply at 
this  wage  level  exceeds  the deinand  for  their 
services  by  employers,  and  unemployment  re- 
sults.  Thus,  the inability  of  these  workers  to 
find  and hold  stable employment  is due to in- 
sufficient  investment in their own human capi- 
tal. This theory suggests, then, that the appro- 
priate  policy  to reduce  the unemployment  of 
disadvantaged  workers  consists  of  extensive 
manpower training and skill upgrading. 
In many respects, this policy prescription is 
very  similar  to that  of  the structuralists, and 
both  of  these  schools  strongly  influenced  the 
format of the great majority of modern Federal 
manpower  programs.  These  programs  began 
in  1961  with  an  emphasis  on  training  unem- 
ployed  workers  in  iegions  with  high  unem- 
ployment,  but  gradually  shifted  their  focus 
from  regional  unemployment  to  unemploy- 
ment  of  specific  groups  of  disadvantaged 
workers. 
The theoretical  foundation  for  the earliest 
of  these programs was provided  by  the theory 
of  structural  unemployment.  Holding  that 
structural factors and  wage  rigidities  prevent- 
ed  employers  from  hiring  poorly  or inappro- 
priately  trained  workers,  this  theory  suggest- 
ed  that  training  would  raise the  productivity 
of  these  workers  to a  level  where they  could 
obtain  employment.  Thus,  though  the  struc- 
turalists  viewed  the  unemployment  as arising 
from  a  structural disequilibrium  in  the labor 
market,  while  the human  capital  school  saw 
the problem  as one of inadequate personal in- 
15/Peter  B. Doeringer and  Michael J. Piore, "Unemployment and 
the  'Dual  Labor  Market',"  The Public  Interest.  No. 38, Winter 
1975, pp. 69-70. 
vestment by  individuals,  both agreed the solu- 
tion  lay  in  expanded  training for  unemployed 
disadvantaged workers.I6 
In  the  late  1960's,  however,  it  was  ob- 
served  that  despite  substantial  labor  market 
tightening  and  numerous  low-paying  job  va- 
cancies,  disadvantaged  workers  continued  to  - 
experience  high  rates  of  unemployment.  As 
correctly  noted  by  the  search  theorists,  the 
problem  was clearly  not  one of  a  chronic job 
shortage  for  disadvantaged  workers,  but 
rather  a  situation  of  excessively  high  labor 
turnover.  Nevertheless, the human capital ap- 
proach  still appeared to be relevant  if  its em- 
phasis  was  changed  from  merely  qualifying 
these workers  for any  job,  to qualifying them 
for good  high-paying jobs at which they  might 
The Dual Labor Market 'Hypothesis  . 
To  another  group  of  economists,  how- 
ever, both the human capital and search-turn- 
over  approaches  seemed  seriously  flawed. 
While  these  two  theories  differ  in  many  re- 
spects,  they  share  the belief  that labor 'mar- 
kets are shaped by  economic motivation  with- 
in  an essentially competitive framework. "Rel- 
ative  wages  are assumed  to be  flexible,  em- 
ployers are believed willing and able to adjust 
their  employment  in  response  to changes  in 
wages  and  productivity,  and  workers  are as- 
sumed  to  make training  and  information  in- 
vestments easily in  response to changes in  rel- 
ative wages."18  - 
Claiming  that these  premises  were  unreal- 
istic  and  misleading,  these  economists  devel- 
16/While one  policy  prescription of the search-turnover approach 
also  stresses  job  training,  this  is done  as  part  of a  multifaceted 
program operatin  on  both the demand and supply  sides. Thus, in 
addition to  provifing job  training for  workers, it  is also proposed 
that  employers  be  aided  in  restructuring their jobs  to  better  fit 
available  manpower. The emphasis  is  not  one  of upgrading the 
skills  of  the  disadvantaged.  per se, but  rather  one  that  concen- 
trates  on  eliminating  skill  mismatches  in  sectors  of the economy 
which  contribute excessively  to inflation. "The unskilled and  dis- 
advantaged . . . will  benefit  disproportionately  from  the  vacuum 
effects  of  general  upgrading and  the  overall  reduction  of  unem- 
ployment that can occur." Holt, pp. 720-21. 
17/Hall, "Prospects. . .", pp. 661.674-81. 
18jDoeringer and Piore, "Unemployment . . .", p. 71. 
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oped  an  alternative view  of  labor  market be- 
havior  which  has  come  to  be  known  as  the 
dual  labor  market  hypothesis.  An  outgrowth 
of  both  the  civil  rights  and  anti-poverty  ex- 
perience of  the 1960's, this school views unem- 
ployment as "rooted  less  in  individual  behav- 
ior than in  the character of  institutions and the 
social  patterns  that  derive  from  them."19 
Much  more of  a "sociological" and "institu- 
tional" approach rather than a purely econom- 
ic  approach to the labor market, it  deals spe- 
cifically  with  trying  to explain  the seemingly 
excessive  job  turnover  in  what  its  proponents 
call "the secondary sector." 
As  advanced  by  Peter  B.  Doeringer,  Mi- 
chael  J.  Piore,  and  others,20 the  hypothesis 
views  the  economy  as  being  conceptually  di- 
visible into a  primary  and a secondary sector. 
The primary  sector  is  characterized  by  good 
jobs,  high  wages,  satisfactory  working  condi- 
tions, employment stability, and prospects for 
promotion. The secondary  sector,  its  antithe- 
sis,  is  characterized  by  bad  jobs,  low  wages, 
poor  working conditions, layoffs, little chance 
for  advancement, and  high  turnover. When  a 
primary-sector  worker  becomes  unemployed, 
he  is  unemployed  in  the involuntary,  Keynes- 
ian sense. He is out of his accustomed place in 
life,  and  though  he  may  temporarily  accept 
other,  less  attractive  work,  he  is  essentially 
waiting to regain  his lost  position. Unemploy- 
ment  in  the secondary sector, however,  is not 
at all  like this.  Rather than consisting  of  peo- 
ple waiting to regain a lost position, it is more 
a process of shuttling from one low-paying po- 
sition to an~ther.~' 
According to this theory, while white adult 
males  are  usually  employed  in  the  primary 
sector,  women,  teenagers  and,  in  particular, 
minority  groups are generally  confined  to the 
19/Ibid,  p. 72. 
2O/Peter  B. Doeringer and Michael  J. Piore, Internal  Labor Mar- 
kets and  Manpower Analysis (New York:  Heath,  1971) and  Mi- 
chael  J. Piore, "Jobs and Training," in Samuel H. Beer and Rich- 
ard  Barringers  (eds.),  The  Stale  and  the  Poor  (Winthrop. 
1970). 
2I/Doeringer and Piore, "Unemployment. . .". pp. 70-7  I. 
secondary sector. But because secondary firms 
provide  little  specific  on-the-job  training,  be- 
cause  there  is  only  a  limited  chance  for  ad- 
vancement,  and  because  a  worker's  current 
wage  is  unlikely  to  differ  widely  from  that 
available  in  a  great  number  of  other  similar 
jobs,  a  worker  finds  little  incentive  to either 
stay on  the job or to perform particularly  well 
at it. Hence, once a worker is in the secondary 
sector, the unstable work environment encour- 
ages the adoption of certain poor work  habits: 
"casual devotion to job, reporting for work late 
or not at all on some days, and quitting with- 
out good reason often within  months of  taking 
the job."22 It is these habits which most clearly 
distinguish  the primary  and secondary  sectors 
and  which  make movement  into  the  primary 
sector so much more difficult. In addition, this 
vicious circle is reinforced  as secondary-sector 
employers  are  unwilling  to invest  heavily  in 
the training of  a work force which is prone to 
high turnover, and simultaneously, are less re- 
luctant to fire a worker in  whom they have lit- 
tle in~ested.~'  These factors thus tend to result 
in entrapment in the secondary sector. 
Above  and  beyond  this  entrapment,  which 
helps to perpetuate the low  productivity  of sec- 
ondary workers, the dualists identify two prin- 
cipal explanations  for the continued duality in 
the face of  market forces which would tend.  to 
eliminate  the wage disparity  between  the two 
sectors. 
The first  of  these  explanations,  restrictive 
practices,  generally  represents  legalized  bar- 
riers to the occupational  mobility  of  workers. 
The prime example of  this is occupational  li- 
censing  by  the  state,  where  access  to  the 
skilled  trades  is  often  controlled  by  license 
boards composed  of  licensed  members  of  the 
supervised  occupations.  These  persons  have 
strong economic incentive to keep the number 
--  --- 
22/Hall. "Prospects . . .", p. 683. 
23/Doeringer and Piore, Internal  Labor Markets, pp. 165-72. Also, 
M~chael  L. Wachter, "Primary and Secondary Labor  Markets: A 
Critique of the  Dual  Approach,  Brookings  Papers on Economic 
Activity (No.  3: 1974).  p. 651. 
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of  workers permitted to practice their trade at 
an  artificially  low  level  in  order  to  raise  the 
wages of  those already licensed.  A  similar  re- 
strictive  practice  is  followed  by  unions  who 
can maintain an artificial scarcity of good jobs 
either  through  a  close  control  of  the  number 
of  apprentices  (as  in  the  craft  unions)  or 
through  negotiating  so  high  a  wage that em- 
ployers  decide to hire fewer  workers than are 
willing to work at that high a wage 
The  second explanation  for the continued 
duality,  discrimination,  is  viewed  as operating 
in  two ways, through statistical discrimination, 
and discrimination  pure and simple. Statistical 
discrimination  represents an attempt to simpli- 
fy  the hiring  procedure  by  assuming  that cer- 
tain  poor  work  habits  are closely  related  to 
personal  characteristics such  as race, age,  or 
sex.  Under  this  procedure,  a  number  of  job 
candidates  may  be  wrongly  rejected  even 
though they are actually qualified. This kind of 
discrimination,  in  conjunction  with  outright 
discrimination,  enlarges  the  secondary  work 
force while reducing the supply of  labor to the 
primary sector. It thereby  gains the economic 
support  both  of  secondary  employers,  who 
now pay a lower wage, and of primary employ- 
ees,  who now  receive a  higher wage.  Further- 
more, although  primary  employers  receive no 
economic  gain  from  outright  discrimination, 
the higher  wages  they  must  pay  are compen- 
sated  by  the  reduced  costs  of .screening  job 
candidates  through  the  use  of  statistical  dis- 
~rimination.~~ 
If this dual labor market schema is correct, 
then  the  potential  effectiveness  of  the  skill 
training programs proposed  by the human cap- 
ital  school  is  open  to  serious  question.  The 
dualists  have  noted  that  a  great  part  of  the 
training necessary  for workers to satisfactorily 
perform  in  the primary  sector cannot  be  pur- 
chased  in  schools  or elsewhere.  Rather, it  is 
only  available on  the job, and, in  order to ac- 
24/Hall, "Prospects.. .", p. 684. 
25/Piore, "Jobs and Training," p. 56. 
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quire  this  training,  the  worker  first  must  be 
hired, and then  must be accepted by the estab- 
lished  group of  workers  who  must  teach  him 
what  they  are doing.  In  other  words, "social 
acceptability," which is directly related to such 
characteristics as race,  sex,  and  shared social 
beliefs, is  a key  factor  in  obtaining  "primary- 
sector" skills  and a job in  the primary sector, 
and this "social  acceptability" cannot be  pur- 
chased in the usual sense.26 
Within  this  framework, the proponents of 
the  dual  labor  market  hypothesis  develop  a 
number  of  policy  options  which  focus  on  the 
institutional forces they feel underlie the struc- 
ture and behavior of the labor market. In par- 
ticular, they  propose  policies to eliminate dis- 
crimination  and  restrictive  practices  which 
have  kept  people  out  of  the  primary  sector, 
and policies to shift the demand for labor, and 
thus jobs, out of  the  secondary  and  into the 
primary sector. 
While their anti-discrimination  policy  calls 
for an intensive, but straightforward, use of in- 
struments like civil  rights legislation and Fed- 
eral contract  compliance  programs,  the dual- 
ists'  proposals  for  shifting  jobs  from  the sec- 
ondary to the primary sector are more compli- 
cated.  Basically,  the  dualists  suggest  a  two- 
pronged  attack:  (1)  having  the  government 
impose the characteristics of  the primary sec- 
tor on  the secondary sector through expanded 
coverage  of  (and  higher)  minimum  wages, 
encouraging  unionization,  and  expanded  cov- 
erage  of  social  legislation;  and  (2)  adopting 
a long-run, stable, full-employment policy. 
The first  set  of  programs  is designed  pri- 
marily  to convert  secondary  sector  jobs  into 
jobs  with  primary-type  characteristics.  Some 
examples  of  occupations  which,  to some  ex- 
tent, have already  undergone this type of  con- 
version  are  longshoring,  unskilled  construc- 
tion  labor, and office cleaning.  It is  assumed 
that  these  policies,  which,  in  effect,  are de- 
signed  to  legislate  higher  wages,  would  also 
26lDoeringer and Piore, "Unemployment. . .", p. 72. Recent Developments in The Theory of Unemployment 
tend to stabilize employment and develop pro- 
motional  ladders as the alternative,  secondary 
job structure becomes more costly for employ- 
ers.  Hospital  and  hotel  jobs,  for  example, 
might  be  particularly  susceptible to this  kind 
of conver~ion.~' 
The second  type  of  program,  adopting  a 
long-run, stable, full-employment  policy, is di- 
rected  at significantly  expanding  the  primary 
sector.  While acknowledging  that the full-em- 
ployment  policy  which  has  been  followed  in 
this  country  has  not  accomplished  this  goal, 
the dualists claim that this has been due to its 
stop-and-go  nature.  Employers  who  believe 
an expansion to be temporary, say the dualists, 
are reluctant  to admit workers to the primary 
labor  market.  Rather than  incur  the costs of 
training and providing career benefits, and the 
problems  which  might  arise  from  the struc- 
tural changes  involved in  this  expansion,  em- 
ployers  would  rather  rely  on  subcontracting 
and  temporary  employment  from  the  secon- 
dary sector. If, however, employers can be con- 
vinced of a strong public commitment to stable 
full-employment,  corresponding  to  an  unem- 
ployment  rate  of  between  3  and  4  per  cent, 
they  would  then  be  much  more  likely,  claim 
the dualists,  to significantly  expand the num- 
ber of jobs in the primary sector.28 
CONCLUSION 
The dual  labor  market  approach,  with  its 
emphasis  on  the  interrelationship  between 
economic,  sociological,  and  institutional  var- 
iables,  has attracted considerable  attention  in 
recent  years  both  within  and  outside the eco- 
nomic  profe~sion.~~  Nevertheless,  neither  it 
alone  nor  the  alternative  theories  of  human 
capital  and  search-turnover,  present  a  com- 
plete picture of the problem of unemployment. 
Due to the complexity  of the labor  market, all 
three  theories  fail  to  consider  important  as- 
pects of  the problem, and all three necessarily 
incorporate simplifying assumptions about the 
structure and behavior of the labor market. 
Thus,  for  example,  the  dualists,  in  their 
policy  prescriptions,  implicitly  assume  that 
secondary  workers  have  all  of  the  necessary 
human  capital  needed  to succeed  in  primary- 
type employment. To the extent  that  this  as- 
sumption is incorrect,  their proposals to legis- 
late higher  wages in  the secondary sector and 
to  expand  the  primary  sector  could  lead  to 
both  higher  unemployment  and  inflation  un- 
less also coupled with  programs to encourage 
formation of  physical and human capital, im- 
prove  job  matches,  and  discourage  turnover. 
Therefore,  rather  than  choosing  between  the 
alternative  theories,  it  is  more  instructive  to 
view  them as an important set of complemen- 
tary  perspectives  on  the nature of  unemploy- 
ment,  which,  when  taken  together,  correctly 
portray  the  problem  of  unemployment  as  a 
complex  interrelationship of  supply,  demand, 
informational, and institutional factors. 
27IDoeringer and  Piore, "Internal . . .",  pp. 181-82, and Wachter, 
pp. 672-73. 
281Doeringer and Piore. "Unemployment. . .". pp. 78-79. 
29/See Wachter, p. 638, and Hall, "Prospects . . .",  p. 682. 
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0 
n recent years larger banks have become in- 
creasingly interested  in  measuring the prof- 
itability  of  corporate  customer  relationships. 
One of the first approaches was account analy- 
sis.'  In  performing a  standard account  analy- 
sis, a bank determines the revenue from a cus- 
tomer's  account  by  multiplying  the  average 
collected  demand  deposit  balance,  generally 
adjusted  for  reserve requirements,  by  an earn- 
ings credit  or allowance. The expenses of  ser- 
vicing the account are computed  by  multiply- 
ing the number  of times a given service is  uti- 
lized  by  the cost-generally  including  an  al- 
lowance for profit-of providing the service. 
While  account  analysis  is  an  important 
step in  determining  the profitability  of  a  cus- 
tomer  relationship,  it  does  not  measure total 
profitability.  Account  analysis  generally  fo- 
cuses on the activity operations for which com- 
pensating  balances  are  maintained-account 
maintenance,  items  deposited,  ledger  entries, 
wire  transfers,  etc.-but  rarely  allows  for 
other services such  as loans, investment coun- 
seling, trust services, etc. It is primarily of use, 
therefore,  in  analyzing  the  accounts  of  non- 
borrowers  with  heavy  activity  charges.  For 
]/A detailed  description  of  account  analysis  procedures  used  in 
correspondent  banking can be found in  the article "Account Analy- 
sis" in  the  December  1971  Monthly  Review of  the  Federal  Re- 
serve  Bank  of  Kansas  City. Since  1971 the  Kansas City  Reserve 
Bank  has collected  figures annually  on  the account  analysis  prac- 
tices  of  m!?or  correspondents. The 1973  survey  results  were re- 
ported  in  How  Correspondents  Analyze  Accounts  for  Profit- 
ability." Banking.  Journal  of  the  American  Bankers  Association, 
Vol. 66, No. 10 (April 1974). 
other customers the omission  of loan relation- 
ships has at times allowed  the double or even 
triple  use  of  compensating  balances.  Since 
crosschecking  is  frequently  not  automatic,  a 
compensating  balance  for  a  loan  might  at 
times  be  used  to  compensate  for  activity 
charges and also serve as a justification for  a 
future call on credit. 
Profitability  analysis  seeks  to  overcome 
some of  the shortcomings  of  account analysis 
by  preparing  considerably  more  detailed  in- 
come and  expense  statements  for  major  cus- 
tomer~.~  Multiple accounts  for a single corpo- 
rate  relationship  are  often  consolidated,  in- 
cluding those of subsidiaries and perhaps even 
major officers. Losses  on  one account,  conse- 
quently,  can  be offset  with  profits  on  others. 
The  earnings  and  expenses  associated  with 
loans and other fee services  not typically con- 
sidered in an account analysis are likely to be 
included  in  a  profitability  statement.  Rather 
than  emphasizing  activity  charges,  however, 
profitability  analysis  focuses  on  commercial 
lending and is of the greatest  use in  determin- 
ing the profitability of net borrowers. 
Specific  methods  of  measuring  customer 
2/A  general  theoretical  description  of  the approaches commonly 
used to measure customer  profitability is contained  in  the first ar- 
ticle  in  this  series, "Alternative  Approaches  Toward  Customer 
Profitability,"  in  the  April  1975  Monthly  Review.  A  more  de- 
tailed  discussion  of  a  variety  of  approaches  to  customer  profit- 
ability  analysis  is  contained  in  a  booklet  by  Kenneth  E.  Reich 
and  Dennis C.  Neff, Customer Projitability Analysis: A  Tool for 
Improving Bank  Projits  (Bank  Administration  Institute  and  the 
Robert Morris Associates), 1972. 
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profitability  differ  significantly  among  banks, 
but  the  general  format  tends  to  be  similar. 
Bank  income  on  a  relationship  is  often  com- 
puted by adding the interest received on  loans, 
the interest earned by  the bank on the custom- 
er's  deposit  funds,  and  various  fees  paid  the 
bank. Expenses include charges for such items 
as  activity  services,  the interest  cost  of  funds 
loaned,  loan  handling  expenses,  and  the cost 
to the bank of  fee services. The difference  be- 
tween income and expenses, net  profit, is then 
related  to some base  representing  the size  of 
the  relationship-net funds  borrowed, allocat- 
ed  capital, gross loans, total revenue,  etc.-to 
obtain an index number for comparing relative 
customer  profitability.  Since estimated  profit- 
ability tends to be strongly influenced  by  loan 
terms such  as compensating  balances, interest 
rates, and associated  fees, the analysis has of- 
ten been proposed as a means to determine the 
loan terms necessary to meet a minimum prof- 
it  goal  for  a  bank.  It  can  also  be  a  helpful 
guide  in  allocating  bank  resources  since  the 
analysis tends to highlight  the most profitable 
types of customers and loans. 
The general  principles involved in  comput- 
ing  customer  profitability  are  illustrated  in 
Table 1 which  contains  a sample profitability 
statement.  While  most  of  the concepts under- 
lying  the  individual  entries  are self-explana- 
tory,  banks  exhibit  little  similarity  in  ap- 
proaching the items. Variations arise from dif- 
ferences  in  the types  of  services  emphasized, 
the  methods  of  costing  those services,  the in- 
terest  charges assigned,  and the base to which 
profits are related. The major focus of this arti- 
cle  is  on  the  comparative  methods  used  by 
banks to determine customer profitability. 
PWE SURVEY RESULTS 
To  broaden  the  information  available  on 
profitability analysis  procedures and to obtain 
data on  figures  actually  used to compute cus- 
tomer profitability,  the Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of  Kansas  City  recently  conducted  a  survey 
Account:  XYZ Manufacturing 
Affiliated Accounts? 
SOURCES AND  USES OF  FUNDS 
1. Average Loon Balance: 
2.  Average Collected Demand Balance: 
3.  Average Time Balance: 
a. Investable Balance (3% reserve): 
4.  Total Loanable Funds (20 + 3a): 
5. Bank Funds Used by Customer (1 - 4): 
a. ~llocated  Capital (8% of 1): 
b. Funds Transferred from Pool (5 - 5a 
6. Gross lnterest Income on loans: 
7. Earnings on Deposits (*%  of 4): 
a. Service Charge Fees: 
b. Loan Commitments: 
c. Data Processing: 
d. Total (80 +  Bb + Bc): 
9. Total Income (6 + 7 +  8): 
10.  Activity Costs from Account Analysis: 
11. lnterest Accrued on Time Deposits: 
12. Charge for Bank Funds Used: 
a.  Allocated Capital (20% of 5a): 
b.  Other Funds [x=%  of (1 - 50)J: 
c.  Total (l2a  + 12b): 
13. Loan Handling Expenses: 
14. Cost of  Fee Services: 
15. Data Processing: 
16.TotalExpenses(lO+ 11 + 12+ 13+ 14+ 
PROFITABIUTY MEASURES 
18. Allocated Capital Index (1  7c  Sa): 
19. Net ProfitsINet Funds Used (17+ 5): 
20. Net Profits/Gross Amount Borrowed (17i  1 
of  account  and  profitability  analysis  tech- 
niques at major correspondent  banks through- 
out  the  country.  Questionnaires  were  sent 
to 138  banks  in  the late fall  of  1974. Among 
the  107  banks  responding  to  the  survey,  all 
provided  figures  on  both  corporate and  cor- 
respondent  account  analysis  and  57  sup- 
plied information on  methods of analyzing cus- 
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tomer  profitability.  The  remaining  50  banks 
indicated  that  a  formal  profitability  analysis 
had not  been  developed  or that it  was only in 
the formative stage. 
The survey showed that both the frequency 
and  function  of  profitability  analysis  vary 
widely among banks. The analysis is primarily 
used  to analyze  corporate customer  relation- 
ships, with  emphasis  normally on  net  borrow- 
ers.  A  few  banks  consider  only  a  specified 
number  of  relationships,  but  most  begin  the 
analysis  whenever  total  borrowing  exceeds 
some  predetermined  limit,  the most  common 
amount  being  $100,000.  The minimum  level, 
however,  ranged  from  a  low  of  $25,000  to a 
high  of  $750,000.  Almost  two-thirds  of  the 
banks noted that the profitability of correspon- 
dent relationships would be analyzed if  sizable 
participation  loans  were  involved.  About  40 
per cent of the survey banks perform the analy- 
sis  on  a  regular  monthly  basis, while another 
20  per  cent  examine  relationships  quarterly. 
Other banks typically  conduct  the analysis ei- 
ther  annually  or  irregularly,  as  when  a  cus- 
tomer has applied  for  a  new  loan or commit- 
ments  are under  negotiation. Although  banks 
that perform  an analysis  frequently are inter- 
ested in  seeing if a relationship has been prof- 
itable  since  the  previous  analysis,  most  give 
primary  emphasis  to  profitability  over  longer 
periods such as a year.' 
SOURCES AND USES OF [FUNDS 
The first step in  computing customer  prof- 
itability  is  to determine  the total  funds  used 
and  supplied  by  the  customer  relationship. 
These"figures  are subsequently  used  to derive 
the, imputed  value  of  funds  borrowed  or  sup- 
3/As  previously noted,  the specific approaches  used  by  banks to 
measure  customer  profitability  often  vary  significantly.  Some 
banks even  have different  formulas  for judging the profitability  of 
alternative  types  of  customers.  Considerable  latitude.  conse- 
quently,  has been  required to cast the survey responses into a gen- 
eral  framework.  Relatively  few  distortions occur  in  this  process, 
but  at times the order  in  which calculations  are made or the  pro- 
cedures used for handling certain components of the analysis could 
affect estimated  profits.  For this reason  the tabulations are not a 
precise guide  and  are  only  representative  of  the  usual approach. 
In  any  event,  only  those  figures used  to analyze  the profitability 
of normal corporate relationships have been tabulated. 
Table 2  .  I 
Per Cent of Bonks 
Including Item 
Fund Source or Use  in Analysis 
FUNDS SUPPLIED TO BANK 
lo. lnvestoble Demand Deposit Funds  89.5% 
b.  Collected Demand Deposit Funds  7.0 
c.  Gross Demand Deposits  1  .8 
d.  Other Demand Deposit Measures  1.8 
I 
20. Interest Bearing Time Deposits 
b.  Noninterest  Bearing Time Deposits  73.7  47,4  1 
eosury Tax and Loon Deposits 
rciol Paper Sold Customer 
otion Loons Sold 
mmercial Loons 
I 
9.  Participation Loons Originated by 
Respondent Bonks  64.9  I  1  10.  Bonk Stock Loans  42.1  1 
11.  Other Loans Designated by 
Loon Officers  57.9 
plied.  They  may  also  serve  as  a  measure  of 
the size of  a  relationship  in  computing  an in- 
dex of comparative customer profitability. 
Table  2  shows  the  percentage  of  survey 
banks  considering  alternative  types  of  fund 
transactions  in  the sources and uses portion of 
the analysis. The table indicates that all survey 
banks  treat  demand  deposits  as  a  source  of 
funds, with  nearly 90 per cent basing the con- 
tribution  on  net  investable funds,  the balance 
remaining after cash items in  process of collec- 
tion  and  an  allowance  for  reserve  require- 
ments  have  been  ded~cted.~  The  remaining 
4/In  addition  to  the  possible deductions  shown  in  the  table,  six 
banks indicated  that  they also  made a deduction  for  the balances 
required  to  support  activity  services.  This  approach  would  not 
affect the estimated  profit on  a customer relationship as long as a 
bank's  earnings  allowance  on  deposit  balances  was  equal  to  the 
figure used  for  the bank's  cost  of funds. However, since  the de- 
duction  woutd  act to increase  net  funds borrowed,  a  profitability 
index based on net funds borrowed would be reduced. 
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banks generally  count either gross or collected 
demand  deposit^.^ 
Among the banks making a  deduction  for 
reserve  requirements,  78.8  per  cent  use  the 
same deduction as in  the account analysis. Of 
these, 40.0  per  cent  base the deduction on the 
highest  marginal  reserve  requirement  for  de- 
mand  deposits  to  which  the  bank  is  subject, 
47.5  per  cent  on  the average reserve  require- 
ment  for demand  deposits, and 12.5  per  cent 
on  an  administratively  set  deduction  bearing 
no  direct  relationship  to  actual  requirements 
but often  tending to be slightly  higher. Eleven 
banks,  however,  have  different  percentage 
deductions in  the  two analyses. Seven of these 
have  no deduction  for  reserve  requirements  in 
the  account  analysis  but  do  make  allowance  - 
for  reserves  in  the  profitability  analysis.  The 
other  four  banks  were  evenly  split  between 
those  having  higher  deductions  in  the  profit- 
ability analysis and those having lower. 
S/The six banks  not  including investable demand deposit  funds in 
the analysis  exhibited  a  variety  of  possibilities.  One  nonmember 
bank  specializing  in  international  finance  includes  gross  demand 
deposits.  Another  nonmember  bank  which  is  permitted  to count 
uncollected  funds  toward  meeting  state  reserve  requirements 
makes a  deduction  only  for  reserves.  A  third  bank  includes  col- 
lected  funds  in  the analysis  but  reduces  the  earnings  allowance 
granted  on  these  funds  by  the  reserve  requirement  percentage. 
This approach  would not  affect  the imputed earnings represented 
by  the relationship,  but  it  would  lower  the estimate  of  net  bank 
funds used by the customer. 
The other  three banks also credit  the customer  with  collected 
demand  deposits,  but  they  do not  reduce  the earnings allowance 
for  reserve requirements. Instead they seek  to give the customer a 
competitive return on all funds deposited.  Since this approach  re- 
sults  in crediting the customer with interest  on  balances  the bank 
must hold as reserves, the cost of the im  uted interest on reserves 
is  then  passed  on  to borrowers  in  the Form  of  a  higher  cost  of 
funds  rate. This  treatment  of  reserve  requirements would  not  af- 
fect the estimated  profitability  of  borrowers  with average percent- 
age compensating  balances.  The imputed  interest  on  nonloanable 
funds would be offset by  the additional charge for funds borrowed. 
Borrowers  with  above  average compensating balances would tend 
to show relatively greater profitability, while those with below av- 
erage balances. lower profitability. 
If  the earnings allowance  granted  by  a bank  on deposit  funds 
is a market rate of  interest  not directly  tied  to the bank's  average 
cost of  funds, charging borrowers for any imputed interest  on non- 
loanable  funds  would  not  be  necessary.  In  this case  the sum  of 
the profits derived from the profitability  analysis for all customers 
would not  necessarily be equal to the actual  profits earned by  the 
bank.  However,  if  the profitability  analysis  is  to be a  measure of 
actual  profits, consistency  requires  that  any  interest  imputed  on 
noninvestable  funds  be offset  with  a charge elsewhere. The usual 
solution is to include this charge in the cost of  funds, thus allocat- 
ing the cost of  reserve requirements to borrowers.  For a more de- 
tailed  discussion  of  these  issues, see  John  F.  Falkenberg,  Profit- 
ability  Analysk:  A  Bank  Marketing  Tool  (unpublished  thesis, 
Ston~er  Graduate School  of  Banking,  Rutgers  University,  1969). 
pp. 61.72.77. 
The remaining sources  of  funds  are rela- 
tively straightforward.  Nearly three-fourths of 
the  banks  include  noninterest  bearing  CD's, 
frequently  after  a  deduction  for  reserve  re- 
quirements.  In  recent  years  these  accounts 
have  become  more  widespread  as  customers 
have  sought  to  minimize  the funds  placed  in 
compensating  balances. Since  reserve  require- 
ments on  time deposits are lower than on de- 
mand deposits, both the bank and the custom- 
er  can  benefit  from splitting  the reserve  sav- 
ings involved with a time deposit. The custom- 
er's  required compensating  balance is reduced 
and  the  bank  obtains  additional  loanable 
funds. The fact  that not  all  banks count such 
time deposits as a source of funds is somewhat 
surprising, but perhaps some do not encourage 
the issuance of these accounts. 
A much lower fraction, 47.4 per cent of the 
banks,  include  investable  funds  from  interest 
bearing time and savings deposits in the analy- 
sis.  Many  of  these  banks  incorporate  these 
accounts only if the rate of interest paid is sub- 
stantially  below current  market rates. Interest 
bearing  CD's  are  often  excluded  from  the 
analysis on  the grounds that they are likely to 
be  viewed  as  investments  by  corporate  trea- 
surers and the funds are not likely to be bound 
to a bank by  a customer relationship. Similar- 
ly, 61.4  per cent of  the banks make allowance 
for  funds  deposited  by  customers in  Treasury 
tax and loan  accounts. While the official  posi- 
tion of most banks is that funds in tax and loan 
accounts  cannot  serve  as  compensating  bal- 
ances,  competitive  pressures  have  forced 
many  to  recognize  that  bank  profits  are in- 
creased  by  the  existence  of  these  accounts. 
Relatively  few  banks  consider  commercial 
paper sold to customers or funds generated  by 
loan  participations sold  respondent banks as a 
source  of  funds  in  the  analysis.  Finally,  al- 
though  not  listed  explicitly  on  the question- 
naire,  several  banks  also  indicated  they  con- 
sidered deposits at foreign  branches and fidu- 
ciary balances among fund sources. 
Loans  represent  the  major  use  of  bank 
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funds.  Virtually  all  banks  list  standard com- 
mercial and industrial loans  in  the profitabili- 
ty  analysis,  with  57.9  per  cent  also counting 
any other loans designated  by officers as being 
related. The treatment of  bankers acceptances 
varied. The majority  of banks do not  include 
acceptances  created  for  customers,  but  35.1 
per  cent  indicated  that acceptances would  be 
entered if  held in  the bank's  own portfolio and 
5.3  per cent stated they would be counted even 
if sold. Interestingly, 17.5 per cent of the banks 
noted  they  considered  a  portion  of  an  unused 
line of credit as a fund use. This procedure was 
justified on the grounds that such lines require 
the bank to maintain  additional liquidity. The 
percentage inclusion  ranged  from  10  per cent 
to 100  per cent, with 10  per cent  being by  far 
the most common am~unt.~ 
In  the  case  of  correspondent  accounts, 
about  two-fifths  of  the  banks  include  bank 
stock  loans and 64.9  per cent count participa- 
tions  in  loans  originated  by  respondents.  In 
contrast, only 17.5 per cent of the banks stated 
that they  give  correspondent  customers credit 
for  funds supplied when  respondent  banks buy 
loan  participations.  This  differential  treat- 
ment could  be the result of  the equivocal atti- 
tude  correspondent  banks  frequently  have 
toward  up-  and downstream  participations.  It 
could also reflect that the survey was conduct- 
ed  shortly  after  a  period  of  credit  restraint 
when  most  smaller  banks  would  have  found 
Federal fund sales a more profitable outlet for 
excess funds than  purchases of loan  participa- 
tions.  In  addition  to  the  standard  types  of 
commercial loans, a few  banks listed a variety 
of special loans that they include in  the analy- 
sis.  Among those listed  were accounts  receiv- 
able  financing,  lease  financing,  purchased  in- 
stalment paper, Eurodollar and foreign branch 
6/ln  the survey  the question  dealing  with  unused lines  of  credit 
proved to be a source of some confusion. Several banks stated that 
they  treated  a  commitment  as  though  a  certain  percentage  had 
been  loaned, but that they did not count  less formal  lines of credit 
as a  use  of  funds.  Unfortunately  the  percentage  of  banks which 
differentiate  between  commitments and loan  lines in  profitability 
analysis  is  not  clear  and  no  figures  were  obtalned  on  the  per- 
centage of commitments included in funds used by customers. 
loans, credit card loans generated by  retailers, 
and overdrafts. 
After  the sources  and  uses  of  funds  have 
been  tabulated, the next step in  a profitability 
analysis  is  usually  determining  the  net  bank 
funds  used  by  the  customer  and  perhaps 
assigning a certain amount of the bank's  capi- 
tal  to the relationship. These figures,  as seen 
from Table 1, are required  for calculating the 
profitability  ratios and  for  computing  the ex- 
pense  entries  for  bank  funds  loaned.  Deriva- 
tion of these figures will be discussed later. 
The  second  major  portion  of  the  profit- 
ability statement measures the income or reve- 
nue obtained  by  the bank  from  the customer 
relationship.  While  numerous  sources  of  in- 
come can  be  listed, the major entries are typ- 
ically interest  received on  loans and the inter- 
est  imputed  on  the deposit  funds  included  in 
the sources section of  the analysis.'  In the case 
of  loans,  the  actual  interest  accruing  during 
the  period  covered  by  the  analysis  would  be 
shown.  Several  approaches,  however,  can  be 
used to impute .interest on  deposit  funds. One 
possibility  is  to  give .the customer  a  return 
equal to what the bank can earn on the funds. 
Banks  choosing  this  avenue  might  tie the in- 
terest  rate to the average return on investable 
funds, the prime loan  rate, or perhaps the cus- 
tomer's  average loan rate. Another option is to 
select  an  interest  rate representing the cost  to 
the  bank  of  obtaining  funds  from  alternative 
7/As a  practical  matter,  many  banks do not  follow the approach 
shown  in  Table  I  of crediting  borrowers  with  interest  on compen- 
sating balances and charging the cost of  money on the full amount 
borrowed.  Instead they take the difference between  average loans 
and the average investable deposit  funds supplied by  the customer 
and assess a charge only for the cost of  money, however measured, 
on  net  funds  borrowed.  In  effect,  this  alternative  approach  is 
equivalent to giving the customer an earnings allowance on invest- 
able  funds equal  to  the cost  of  money and charging the cost  of 
money on  all  funds borrowed.  Throughout the tabulations, banks 
including  a  charge  only  for  net  funds  borrowed  have  been  en- 
tered as though both interest calculations are made independently. 
One  survey  bank  does  not  impute  an  earnings  allowance  on 
demand  deposits.  To  measure  customer  profitability,  this  bank 
computes  the ratio of  accrued  interest  on  loans to net  funds bor- 
rowed. This approach is tantamount  to giving an earnings  allow- 
ance  on  deposits  equal  to  the  average  interest  rate  on  the  cus- 
tomer's  loans.  The bank,  consequently,  has  been  entered  in  the 
tabulations as though an explicit interest allowance were given. 
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sources.  In  this instance the bank  might  base 
the return  on such money market rates as the 
Federal  funds  rate, the discount  rate, the rate 
on  large  denomination  CD's,  the  average or 
marginal  cost  of  borrowed  money,  or  some 
combination  of  these rates. Finally, the return 
could  represent  what  the customer  could earn 
if  the  funds  had  been  invested  directly  in  the 
money  market. Banks exercising  this  alterna- 
tive would consider market rates like the Trea- 
sury bill rate or perhaps the rate on CD's. 
Among  the  57  survey  banks,  20  different 
rates or combinations of  rates  were specified 
for imputing interest on deposit funds. Further 
variance  was  created  as  some  banks  use 
monthly, quarterly, or annual averages of rates 
and others use future projections of  rates. Re- 
gardless,  at  the time of  the survey  the inter- 
est  rates on  deposit funds ranged. from 8.0 per 
cent  to 12.17  per  cent,  with  the average and 
median  rates  being 9.41  per  cent  and 9.5  per 
cent, respectively.  By  comparison, the average 
3-month  Treasury  bill  rate  during  the  third 
quarter was 8.19 per cent, the average Federal 
funds rate, 12.09  per cent, and the prime rate, 
12.0 per cent. Among the market rates select- 
ed, the most common  was  the 3-month Trea- 
sury bill rate which was used by  14.0 per cent 
of  the banks.  However,  44.9  per  cent  based 
the credit on the cost of marginal or purchased 
funds, generally  using various combinations of 
the  rates  listed  above.  Nearly  all  other  banks 
tied the earnings allowance to the average cost 
of loanable funds, the commercial paper  rate, 
or to interest  rates charged on loans. A small 
group had administratively set earnings allow- 
ances not linked directly to any market rate. 
Most  banks  also  give  customers  income 
credit  for  direct  payments  made to cover ser- 
vice  charges  and  loan  commitments.  Service 
charge  income  generally  represents  any 
amount  paid to the bank for  activity  costs or 
any  charge  associated  with  obtaining  loans, 
such  as  points.  In  the  case  of  commitment 
fees, an entry would be made only if a custom- 
er  paid an outright fee for a commitment or a 
Fees Received for lnternational 
6.  Fees Received for Trust Services 
7. Fees Received for Money Market 
8.  Loan Commitment Fees 
2.  Loan Handling Expense 
3. Direct Charge for Loan Risk 
4.  Interest Paid Customer on Time 
and Savings Deposits 
5. Cost of Issuing Lines of Credit 
6.  Computer Services Expense 
7.  International Services Expense 
8. Trust Services Expens 
10.  Cost of Money 
line of  credit. If a compensating balance had 
been maintained  instead, these funds would be 
reflected in  the sources and uses section  of the 
analysis,  and  earnings  accordingly  imputed. 
Among  the banks participating  in  the survey, 
20.0  per cent indicated they strongly  preferred 
to  receive  fees  as  compensation  for  commit- 
ments,  37.1  per  cent  desired  balances,  and 
42.9  per 'cent stated either  method of compen- 
sation  was  satisfactory.  While  many  banks 
noted the commitment fee could vary with cir- 
cumstances  or  the type of  loan, the standard 
charge at most  banks  was 0.5  per cent  of  the 
commitment amount. The range of fees, how- 
ever, varied from 0.25  per cent to 1.0 per cent. 
If  balances  were  required,  customers  were 
generally  expected  to  keep  the  standard  10 
per cent of an unused commitment and 20 per 
cent for any borrowing. 
Additional sources of income considered by 
banks  vary  greatly.  As Table  3  shows, about 
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one-third  of  the banks  include the income  re- 
ceived  from  data  processing  services,  interna- 
tional services,  trust services,  and such  money 
market  services  as the  purchase  of  securities 
and  wire  transfers.  The  inclusion  of  income 
from  these  nonloan  services  is  rather  contro- 
versial. Some banks feel  income should be in- 
cluded in  a profitability analysis only if it is de- 
rived from regular bank services or loans.  Un- 
der  this  view,  specialized  services  are treated 
independently  of  normal  bank  operations. 
These functions serve as separate profit centers 
and any profit they make is not allowed to in- 
fluence the estimated  profitability on customer 
loans. Others,  however,  believe that an  accu- 
rate picture of  the profitability  of  a  customer 
relationship can be obtained only if  all income 
and  expenses are included. Banks in this latter 
group often  maintain  that customers  are not 
likely  to differentiate  among  profit  centers in 
i 
considering the compensation  for  a  bundle of 
bank  services.  Regardless,  if  a  bank  includes 
the funds  received  for  a specialized  service  in 
the income  portion  of  the statement,  the cost 
of  providing  that service should  also  be listed 
under expenses. 
The  preceding  types  of  income  were  all 
covered in  the survey questionnaire and the re- 
sponses  imply  the list  is  relatively  complete. 
Among the 57 banks, only seven listed any ad- 
ditional sources  of  income  as being included. 
Three of the banks stated that any fee income 
received  would  be counted  and  two  noted  the 
inclusion  of  fees  associated  with  credit  card 
plans.  Two  also count  fees  for  security  safe- 
keeping  and  cash  management  services. 
Whether  other  banks may  have omitted some 
additional  but  relatively  unimportant  sources 
of  income  cannot  be  determined. 
EXPENSES 
The third major section  of the profitability 
statement  derives  the bank's  expenses  for ser- 
vicing the customer  relationship.  In  many  re- 
spects this  portion  of  the analysis is the most 
complicated  and controversial.  The difficulties 
arise from the numerous  possible  ways of  de- 
riving and allocating  the costs of services and 
funds.  These  estimated  costs  will  often  vary 
significantly with the number of services cost- 
ed, the types  of  cost  utilized,  and  the base to 
which costs are related. A complete description 
of costing methods would be beyond the scope 
of  this  article,  but  the nature of  some of  the 
choices can be made clear. 
In a complete study, all costs must be allo- 
cated.  Banks  pricing  fewer  services,  conse- 
quently, would  tend to have a higher  price for 
those  services.  In  the  past,  most  banks  have 
recognized that allocating costs in a multiprod- 
uct firm is always somewhat arbitrary and they 
have practiced a policy of  pricing bundled ser- 
vices. Under this approach the costs of all ser- 
vices are spread among a relatively small num- 
ber  of  activities.  Customers  are  implicitly 
charged  fbr noncosted services  whenever  they 
use  one  for  which  charges  have  been  estab- 
lished.  Those  using  uncosted  services  with 
above average frequency would tend to benefit 
from  this  approach,  while  those  with  below 
average frequency would tend to lose. 
The  types  of  costs  estimated  can  affect 
profitability  calculations.  In  pricing  activity 
services,  banks  could  use  marginal,  variable, 
or total costs. Any of these could be figured us- 
ing  historical costs, standard costs,  or project- 
ed costs. Similar considerations apply in deter- 
mining the charge that should be made for the 
cost  of  money.  Two  methods  are commonly 
used. The first is to base the cost of money on 
the bank's  average cost  of  funds  and the sec- 
ond is to use a  rate representing the marginal 
cost of funds purchased by the bank. Neither is 
wholly  satisfactory. Basing  the charge on  the 
average cost  is likely to result in  understating 
the cost of acquiring loanable funds in  periods 
of  tight  money,  and  perhaps  overstating  the 
cost  in  times  of  easy  money.  When  interest 
rates are rising and additional loanable funds 
must  often  be  purchased, the marginal cost of 
funds  increases  much  more  rapidly  than  the 
average cost.  Unless the interest  rate on loans 
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made at such times exceeds the marginal cost 
of  funds, losses will  be incurred. However, the 
use  of  a  marginal  cost  of  funds  rate during 
such  periods  would  result  in  overstating  total 
fund  costs.  Moreover,  it  would  ignore  the 
profits which arise from the ability of banks to 
lock  in  rate differentials  on  some  assets  and 
liabilities.  Many  banks  seek  to  keep  a  suffi- 
cient  amount  of  cheap  core  money  (demand 
deposits  and  consumer  time  and  savings  de- 
posits)  to  finance long-term  fixed  rate assets 
like  mortgages and  bonds.  Even  if  rates rise, 
a  bank  is  still  assured  of  a  positive earnings 
spread on this portion of its portfolio. 
The  base on  which  charges  are computed 
can  often  influence  estimated  profitability. 
Loan  handling  expenses  provide  an  example. 
Once  the  costs  of  the  loan  department  have 
been  determined,  a  variety  of  methods could 
be  used  to  allocate  costs  to  borrowers.  One 
possibility  would  be to determine the average 
cost per note or renewal. This approach, how- 
ever,  could  place  an  unduly  heavy  charge 
against  the  small  borrower  whose  loan 
application  is  relatively  simple  to  process. 
Costs could  be  allocated in  proportion  to the 
number  of  dollars  borrowed,  but  this  method 
could overstate  the cost  associated  with large 
loans, since processing time normally does not 
increase directly  with  the size of  a  loan.  An- 
other approach  would be to express costs as a 
function  of  available  manhours.  If  officers 
were  to  maintain  an  accurate  record  of  the 
time  spent  on  each  note,  the  hourly  charge 
could then  be allocated  to the customer. Un- 
fortunately, this method could result in  higher 
charges for customers assigned to less efficient 
loan officers. None of  the alternatives is whol- 
ly  satisfactory, and as a result, some banks use 
combinations  of  each.  On  balance,  many 
somewhat arbitrary decisions must be made in 
allocating costs and these  decisions will  often 
have a significant impact on the estimated cost 
of servicing a customer relationship. 
The  percentage of  survey  banks  including 
selected  types  of  expenses  in  the  customer 
profitability  analysis  is  shown  in  Table 3. As 
can  be seen,  nearly  all  banks made an  entry 
for  activity services. Among these banks, over 
half stated the charges were based on prices of 
services  as  specified  in  the  account  analysis 
and slightly  less than  one-third indicated they 
were  based  on  actual  costs.  The  remaining 
banks did not  specify  how  the charge was de- 
rived.  The  method  of  charging  seems  to de- 
pend  largely  on  the  degree  of  confidence  a 
bank  has in  its cost figures and on  whether  it 
wishes  to assign  profits  from  activity  services 
to  general  profits  associated  with  loans.  If  a 
bank  has not  fully  costed  all  activity  services 
or the accuracy of  its cost  estimates is  uncer- 
tain, use of the price figures tends to build in a 
margin  for  unlisted  services and for  potential 
underestimates  of  cost.  In  addition.  some 
banks  feel  that it  is  inappropriate to allocate 
all  profit  to loans.  According to these banks, 
the users of services requiring  much labor and 
equipment  should  be  expected  to  contribute 
to the profitability  of  those services. If  prices 
are used, an allowance  for  profit  can  bi  built 
in  and  that  allowance  can  even  vary  among 
services.  everth he less; if  price rather than cost 
figures are used, caution  must  be exercised in 
interpreting the profit estimated  by  the analy- 
sis since it could be an understatement. 
The survey did  not  request  information on 
the estimated costs to banks of  performing ser- 
vices. Consequently, direct comparisons of  the 
charges  for  activity  services  as  computed  in 
the  profitability  analysis  are  not  possible. 
However,  data  were  obtained  on  the charges 
made by  banks in  the account analysis. These 
charges  and  the  corresponding  collected  bal- 
ance  requirements  for  a  variety  of  corporate 
banking services are shown in  Table 4.8 As can 
8/The tabulations in Table 4 are based on the 106 banks providing 
information on their account analysis procedures.for corporate cus- 
tomers. While  these  types  of  figures could  be  used  to determine 
the  profitability  of  nonborrowing  customers  with  heavy  activity 
usage,  they  are  not  fully  comparable  to those used in  the  profit- 
ability analysis. The number of banks included in Table 4 is nearly 
double that of the profitability analysis  figures reported elsewhere 
in  this  article.  Morwver, at  some  banks the charges  for  activity 
services  in  the  profitability  analysis  are  based  on  the  cost  of 
providing the service, while the charge in  the account  analysis  in- 
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be seen, most  banks make explicit charges for 
account maintenance,  ledger  entry credits and 
debits,  items  deposited  and  returned,  wire 
transfers,  currency  and  coin  furnished,  pay- 
able through  drafts,  and domestic collections. 
A  smaller  proportion  charge  for  securities 
drafts, currency and coin deposited, bond cou- 
pons collected, and stop  payment^.^ 
The most  outstanding feature of  the table 
is the very wide range that exists among banks 
in  the  prices  and  collected  balance  require- 
ments for these standard banking services. For 
example,  the charge for encoded  items depos- 
ited at one bank  is  0.54 and at another bank 
the  charge  is  64.  Similarly,  the  minimum 
charge of  34 for ledger  entry  credits is about 
one-thirtieth  the maximum  of  874. While the 
price  figures  form  the basis  of  the charges in 
both the account and profitability analyses, the 
collected  balance figures are a  better measure 
of  the actual cost to customers  of activity ser- 
vices. A bank with a higher price may actually 
have a lower effective price if  it is more gener- 
ous  with  the earnings  allowance  or  makes  a 
smaller deduction  for  reserves.  For compara- 
tive purposes  the median collected balance re- 
quirement  is  probably  more  meaningful  than 
the average. A tendency exists for many banks 
cludes a  markup for profit. Also, the earnings  allowance and de-  to have  ;lightly  below  average prices  while  a 
duction for  reserve requirements at times differ between the profit-  few  have  prices  above  average.  ability  and  account  analyses  at  the  same  bank.  The  degree  to 
which these types of  factors could bias the figures in Table 4 from 
being representative of  those used  in  the profitability analysis can-  The group of services in Table 4 are those 
not be known but definite tendencies are ~resent.  for  which  relatively  fixed account analysis fees 
The collected balance requirements in  Table 4 refer to balances 
a customer  must hold for a given service, not  what remains  after  have commonl~  been  established.  banks 
a  deduction  for  reserve requirements  has been  made. Specifically,  also  charge  for  a  variety  of  miscellaneous 
if  P is the price of a transaction or service, i is the imputed earnings 
allowance at an  annual  rate and expressed as a decimal,  and  r is  transactions but these vary from bank to bank. 
the  fraction  of  collected  balances  deducted  to  meet  reserve  re- 
quirements,  the annual collected  balance  required for a given ser-  Examples of services  for which comparatively 
vice can be derived from the following formula: 
B = P/[i(1.00-r)l.  few  banks charge are cashing  payroll  checks, 
If  the complications  associated  with  compounding  interest  are ig-  issuance  of  duplicate  statements  or  cashiers 
nored, the collected balance  required to generate sufficient income 
over  one  month  to  pay  for  a  service  would  be  twelve  times  the  checks,  credit  investigations,  phone  calls,  in- 
amount indicated by B. 
The survey also obtained  data on  the  rocedures  used  to ana- 
lyze the accounts of respondent  banks.  rile the prlces and earn- 
ings allowances at  many  banks were identical for  both corporate 
and respondent customers,  at others they differed. In general, cor- 
porations  tend  to  have  higher  charges  for  checks  deposited,  re- 
turned items, and wire transfers. Correspondent  customers tend to 
be  charged  higher  prices for account  maintenance  and some cur- 
rency  and  coin  transactions.  For  other  services  the  charges  are 
generally quite similar. Copies  of  the account analysis tabulations 
applicable to respondent banks are available from the author. 
9  A few  comments  on Table 4 are in  order. Banks  not  shown  as  charging  in  the account  analysis  may  in  some  instances  require 
customers  to  pay  direct  fees  for  the services.  Previous  surveys, 
however, have generally suggested that such practices are relative- 
ly  uncommon  for standard  activity  services  involving no  out-of- 
pocket expenses to the bank. If expenses are incurred, such as an 
exchange charge for collecting a nonpar check, these costs are nor- 
mally passed on directly. 
In  reducing  the account  analysis  charges  to  the common  de- 
nominator of  required collected  balances, a number  of  difficulties 
arose. One bank  has a sliding earnings credit  which falls with  the 
size of  the account. Since the range  in  the earnings  allowance  is 
small,  the  maximum  rate has arbitrarily  been  used to determine 
required  collected  balances.  Similarly.  most  banks  list  explicit 
account  maintenance  fees  in  their  analysis,  but  a  number  have 
only  indirect  maintenance  fees.  Such  maintenance  fees  could 
arise if  a bank has a charge for a monthly statement or has varying 
charges for the number of  items deposited. The bank, for example, 
might charge 2.254 for  the first  1,000 items deposited  and  26  for 
all  additional  items.  In  effect,  customers  depositing  over  1,000 
checks  are  charged  a  maintenance  fee  of  $2.50  and  a  rate  per 
check  of  24.  In  tabulating  the  results,  any  charge  for  a  regular 
monthly  statement  has  automatically  been  considered  to  be  an 
account  maintenance  fee;  but  a  similar  adjustment  cannot  be 
made  for  banks which  have  marginal  charges  for the  number  of 
vestment  advice,  negative  collected  balances, 
and FDIC insurance.  In addition, most banks 
charge  for  such  services  as security safekeep- 
ing,  account  reconciliation,  lockbox  opera- 
items deposited.  In a  few  instances  the number  of  items required 
to secure  the  minimum  charge is  so high  that  comparatively  few 
customers would be able to qualify. Although it makes little differ- 
ence in  the averages  reported  in  the table whether the  minimum 
or maximum per item charges are used, the average of  the two has 
been used wherever reasonable. 
A more basic shortcoming of several of  the entries in the table 
is that they do not fully show the diversity that exists in the pricing 
structure  of  individual  banks.  Most  banks.  for  example,  have  a 
standard charge for all domestic collection items, but some charge 
a given gercentage of the amount of the collection, and others differ- 
entiate  etween  cash and noncash collections or among documen- 
tary and clean collections, city and country collections, etc. Where 
alternative  types  of  collections  are designated,  the  prices  often 
vary significantly. To enter these banks in the tabulations, the min- 
imum charge for noncash documentary  collections was used when- 
ever  available. Some banks,  however, may  have charges  for such 
collections  which  were  not  reported  on  the  questionnaire.  The 
charges shown for collection items, consequently, are at best indic- 
ative of  the general range of charges and could be significantly bi- 
ased. Similarly, the charge for  wire transfers at some banks de- 
pends on  whether the transfer is processed by the Federal  Reserve. 
In  these cases,  the charge for  Federal  Reserve transfers was en- 
tered.  While the  figures must be interpreted in  light of  these limi- 
tations,  such  tabulating  problems  occur  relatively  infrequently 
among the list of standard services shown in  the table. Moreover, 
any special charges would have only a minor or insignificant effect 
on the reported average and median figures. 
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tions,  and cash  management  services,  but  the 
prices  imposed  are often  negotiated  and  vary 
with  volume  and  the  precise  services  per- 
formed.  As  a  result,  simple  tabulations  of 
these  prices  are not  possible.  Their  omission 
should  not  be  interpreted  as  suggesting  that 
these  fees  are  unimportant;  for  some  cus- 
tomers they could represent the major expense 
in the account analysis. 
The charges  for  nonactivity  services  dem- 
onstrate similar  diversity.  Among  the  survey 
banks  with  a  customer  profitability  analysis, 
45.6  per  cent  include  a  charge  for  loan  han- 
dling  costs.  This  entry  is  usually  intended  to 
cover  the  operation  and  maintenance  of  the 
loan department, salaries of loan  officers, and 
any  nonbillable  expenses  the  bank  incurs  in 
making  loans,  such  as  legal  fees.  Unfortu- 
nately,  relatively  few  banks  provided  detailed 
information  on  the  precise  magnitude  of  the 
charges  levied. Among those that did, slightly 
over half indicated that the charge was direct- 
ly  proportional to the dollar amount borrowed, 
with the fee ranging from .35 per cent to .6 per 
cent  of  the loan  at different  banks. About  a 
fourth  of  the banks use a flat charge per loan, 
,  occasionally  varying with the type of loan. Re- 
maining banks demonstrated a variety  of  pos- 
sibilities  including  charges  for  the number  of 
hours of  loan  officer time, standard costs  per 
payment or transaction, and a handling charge 
based  on  loan  risk.  By  comparison,  several 
banks  not  making charges  for  loan  handling 
expenses commented that these expenses were 
treated as  fixed  costs since  the bank  was,re- 
quired to maintain  staff and overhead  regard- 
less of whether a particular loan was made. 
One-third of the survey banks also included 
an expense entry for loan risk. The function of 
this entry  is to prevent  loans with the highest 
yield and risk from automatically appearing to 
be  the  most  profitable.  Most  banks  base the 
charge on their historical loan loss experience. 
While several attempt to classify loans by  risk 
categories and charge accordingly, others sim- 
ply  use  the same figure  for all  loans.  Among 
a  limited  sample  of  banks  which  provided 
complete  information,  the  charge  for  risk 
ranged  from  .06  per  cent  to 2.4  per  cent  of 
the  loan  amount,  with  the  average  charge 
being about .25  per  cent. This figure is gener- 
ally  comparable to the loan  loss experience of 
Federal  Reserve  member  banks  which  aver- 
aged .24 per cent in 1972, .26 per cent  in 1973, 
and .39 per cent in  1974. Although an expense 
entry  is  one  method  of  accounting  for  risk, 
most banks prefer other options. These include 
such  possibilities  as assigning more capital to 
riskier  loans  or increasing the desired  net  re- 
turn (or profit rate) on riskier loans. 
A charge for the cost of  money loaned is in- 
cluded in the profitability analysis by  70.2 per 
cent of the survey banks. In general, banks list- 
ing such  charges  tend  to emphasize  net  profit 
or  allocated  capital  ratios  while  other  banks 
usually calculate  gross profit ratios. Examples 
of each are shown  in  Table 1. At the time of 
the survey, the interest rates used for the cost of 
funds  ranged  among banks from  7.2  per cent 
to 12.09 per cent, with the average and median 
figures  being 9.79  per  cent  and 10.0  per cent, 
respectively.  These  comparatively  high  rates 
reflect  the  timing  of  the  survey,  which  oc- 
curred  shortly  after  interest  rates  began  de- 
clining from  historic peaks. The marginal cost 
of  funds  at this time was well above the aver- 
age for most banks. About three-fourths of the 
banks,  as  a  result,  based  the  cost  of  funds 
charge  on  various  short-term  money  market 
interest  rates  representing  the  cost  of  pur- 
chased funds. The most common rates selected 
were  those  on  Federal  funds  and  3-month 
CD's,  but  a  noteworthy  group  of  banks also 
used the rates on commercial paper, Treasury 
bills, and  borrowings at  the discount  window. 
Often an average of several  of  these rates was 
taken. The remaining one-fourth  of  the banks 
generally  employed  their  average  cost  of 
funds. Among all banks including a charge for 
the  cost  of  money,  approximately  five-sixths 
had exactly the same rate for the cost of funds 
as was used  to impute interest  on  the deposit 
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funds supplied  by  the customer. No consistent 
relationship,  however,  was  evident  among  the 
small  group  using  different  interest  rates  for 
the  two  variables.  These  banks  were  equally 
divided  between  those  which  had  higher  and 
lower charges for the cost of funds. 
Slightly  over  one-third  of  the  banks  in- 
cluded a charge to cover the desired return on 
capital allocated  to the customer relationship. 
On average, these banks sought a pretax return 
on capital of about 25 per cent, but the figure at 
individual banks varied from 10 to 50 per cent. 
The most  common  amount, however,  was  20 
per cent, which  was applied by  nearly  half the 
banks.  The  methods  of  allocating  capital 
among  customer  relationships  will  be  dis- 
cussed  subsequently, but  for  the time being it 
should be noted that banks wishing to build in 
a desired  return on  capital  have at least  three . 
options.  First,  the bank's  capital can  be  allo- 
cated  among  customers,  the  desired  return 
specified, and an explicit entry made under ex- 
penses  for  the desired  return  on  capital. This 
approach is demonstrated in  Table 1.  For this 
method  to  be  consistent  with  actual  profits 
earned  by  the  bank,  the  capital  allocated 
should be equal to the total capital of the bank 
and  the charge  for  noncapital  loanable funds 
should  be  based  on  the  actual  cost  of  those 
funds. 
The  second option would be for a bank to 
set  a desired  return on  ca'pital and to include 
capital in  the bank's  general  pool of  loanable 
funds.  Banks  using  this approach  would  tend 
to find that the average cost of pool funds was  , 
greater  than  in  the  previous  instance  because 
the desired  pretax  return  on capital  is  usually 
substantially  higher  than  the  bank's  cost  of 
other loanable funds. A  third possibility is for 
a bank to assume again that all loanable funds 
are  derived  from  a  general  pool,  of  which 
capital represents one component. Rather than 
including a target return on capital in  the cost 
of  funds,  however, the bank could temporarily 
consider capital to be costless. The desired  re- 
turn on capital could be attained by specifying 
the minimum  levels of the various profitability 
ratios  necessary  to  realize  that  return. 
Variants of  this approach  are frequently  used 
by  banks not allocating capital to customer re- 
lationships or  not  including  any allowance for 
the  desired  return  on  capital  under  the  ex- 
pense category of the analysis. 
Despite  these  considerations,  alternative 
methods of handling the desired return on cap- 
ital  had  little  effect  on  the  average  cost  of 
funds.  With  only  two  exceptions, each  of  the 
20  banks  that  included  an  expense  entry  for 
the desired  return on capital based the cost of 
funds  on  money  market  rates  rather  than  the 
bank's average cost of funds. In fact, the aver- 
age cost of funds rate of 9.94 per cent for banks 
expressly  including  a  charge  for  capital  was 
less  than  the  average  rate  of  10.06  per  cent 
for  banks  not  building  in  such  a  charge. On 
balance,  these  considerations  suggest  that 
most  banks  use  the  profitability  analysis  to 
show  the effect  on  profits if  the customer re- 
lationship were to be lost, but do not attempt 
to  make the sum  of  the profits  estimated  by 
the analysis equivalent to actual bank profits. 
The  remaining  entries  shown  under  ex- 
penses in  Table 3  are largely self-explanatory. 
Banks including interest bearing time and sav- 
ings deposits in  the analysis of  funds supplied 
by  the customer must make a deduction under 
expenses  for  the interest accrued on  those de- 
posits. To the extent that the interest actually 
paid differs from the interest imputed on those 
funds,  the  profitability  of  the  customer  rela- 
tionship would  be  raised or lowered. Likewise, 
banks which  include the income from  various 
fee  services  like  data  processing  or  money 
market  transactions in  the income  portion  of 
the statement  are required  to make a  deduc- 
tion  under  expenses for  the costs of these ser- 
vices.  Finally,  a  small  group  of  banks  listed 
several  miscellaneous  charges  that were likely 
to  be  included  with  expenses.  Among  these 
items were demand deposit administration and 
overhead  charges,  the  expense  of  granting 
lines  of  credit,  loan  entry  and  maintenance 
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costs,  an  allowance  for  the cost  of  servicing 
Treasury tax and loan accounts, and  the costs 
associated  with  leasing  operations,  security 
safekeeping,  credit  card  plans,  and  cash 
management services.1° 
THE PROFITABILITY RATIOS 
After the total  income and expenses asso- 
ciated  with  the  customer  relationship  have 
been  estimated,  the next  step is  to determine 
the  difference  between  the  two.  At  banks 
which do not build in  an allowance for the cost 
of  funds under expenses,  this difference  would 
measure  the  estimated "gross  profit"  on  the 
relationship.  However, if the cost of  funds has 
previously  been  included,  it  would show "net 
profit." Although a profit figure contains valu- 
able  information,  most  banks  place  primary 
emphasis on a variety of  profitability ratios de- 
signed to adjust the profit figure for differences 
in  the size of customer relationships. Numerous 
profitability  ratios could  be computed, but  at 
most banks profitability is judged on  the basis 
of  a  handful of standard  indicators. These in- 
clude  the ratios of gross  profits  to  net  funds 
used,  net  profits to net  funds  used, net  profits 
to gross amount borrowed, and  net  profits  to 
allocated capital." 
For individual banks, the particular ratio or 
ratios  selected  largely  appear  to have  been  a 
management  decision. Factors such as tbe size 
of  a bank, its location, or the sophistication of 
its analysis  procedures do  not  explain  the dif- 
ferences.  In part, the variance may arise from 
the fact  that  no single profitability measure is 
necessarily  superior.  Regardless,  one  point 
must  be  emphasized.  While  only  one  of  the 
10/0nly  eight  banks indicated  that  they  charged  for setting  up 
lines  of  credit.  Where  figures  were  provided,  this  expense  entry 
was  generally  the  same as  the  amount  listed  under  income  for 
lines of credit. It is not clear if  banks using this approach estimated 
that the cost was actually equal to the fee charged customers or if 
they werejust removing any profit associated with this item. 
II/A  detailed analysis of the  applicability  and  behavior of  these 
profitability  indicators  under  varying situations  was  presented  in 
the  preceding  article in  this series.  As a  result,  the discussion  in 
this  article  is  largely  limited  to the direct  results  of  the survey. 
Also, since many banks compute more than one profitability ratio, 
the tabulations include some banks more than once.  , 
commonly  used  indexes  makes  any  explicit 
reference  to  bank  capital,  many  banks  using 
other  profitability  measures  have  established 
target  returns  on  capital.  In  general,  these 
alternative ratios can  be related in  a fairly  di- 
rect way to the earnings on capital and the de- 
sired  return  on  capital  can  set  minimum  ac- 
ceptable values for the noncapital ratios. 
Twelve  of  the  survey  banks  compute  the 
ratio  of  gross  profits  to net  funds  used.  If  a 
customer is a net borrower, the value of this in- 
dex  can  be  compared  directly  to  the  bank's 
cost  of  funds  or  to  money  market  rates.  As 
long  as  the  ratio  exceeds  the  bank's  cost  of 
funds, the relationship would be profitable. To 
ensure that  a  target  return  on capital is  real- 
ized,  however,  the  index  must  exceed  the 
bank's  cost  of  funds  by  a  sufficient  margin. 
The survey did  not explore the issue fully, but 
several  banks commented  that an interest dif- 
ferential of 2  to 3  per cent  was generally  ade- 
quate to meet profit objectives. 
Despite  the  relative  ease  in  computing 
gross  profits,  most  banks  prefer  to  base  an 
analysis of  customer profitability on  net  prof- 
its.  Net  profits are gross  profits  minus an  al- 
lowance  for the cost of funds. Among the sur- 
vey  banks,  12 compute the ratio of  net  profits 
to net funds loaned. This profitability ratio dif- 
fers  from  the  gross  profitslnet  funds  used 
measure  only  in  that  the  cost  of  funds  (ex- 
pressed  as  a  percentage)  is  subtracted  from 
' 
the gross profit yield. If the gross profit index, 
for example,  were  10 per cent and the cost of 
funds  were  6  per  cent,  net  profitslnet  funds 
used would be 4 per cent. Obviously, a positive 
ratio for net borrowers implies the relationship 
is  profitable.  Another  customer  profitability 
measure used by  13 of the banks was the ratio 
of  net  profits  to gross  amount  borrowed.  A 
zero value for this ratio would imply a break- 
even  situation.  Banks  utilizing  this  formula, 
though,  generally  seek  a  minimum  return  on 
gross loans of  1.5 to 2.5  per cent to realize  a 
desired return on capital. 
The fourth  profitability  measure,  the ratio 
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of net profits to allocated capital, was reported 
by  12 banks. If capital is allocated to both earn- 
ing  assets  and  deposits,  this  index  is  per- 
haps  the  most  versatile  of  those widely  used. 
The profitability of all customers, both borrow- 
ers and nonborrowers, can be analyzed. Of the 
20  banks  in  the  survey  explicitly  allocating 
capital  to customer relationships,  19  provided 
information on  the general methods of allocat- 
ing capital. Nine of the banks assign capital as 
a flat percentage of loans, with the same frac- 
tion being used for all customers. Among these 
banks,  the  percentages  ranged  from  5  to  10 
per  cent,  with  nearly  half  using  8  per  cent. 
Four banks assign capital to both deposits and 
loans,  with  two  of  these  using  unvarying  per- 
centages.  Only  two  banks  volunteered  that 
capital was assigned  in  relation to risk  ratings 
on loans. The remaining four banks a11  allocate 
capital  to loans  only  but  did  not  specify  the 
allocation methods. 
Four-fifths  of  the banks responding  to the 
survey utilize one or more of the four basic ra- 
tios just discussed in  analyzing customer  prof- 
itability.  The remaining  banks have all  devel- 
oped alternative measures.  These include such 
ratios as gross profits/total  loans, net  profits/ 
total  revenue,  total  incornelnet  funds  bor- 
rowed, actual incorneltarget income, and total 
revenueltotal  expenses.  Three banks compute 
net  or  gross  profits, but do not relate the fig- 
ure to any  specific  indicator of  the size  of  a 
customer  relationship. Several  banks also cal- 
culate  separate  ratios  for  the  profitability  of 
activity  services.  Unfortunately,  space  con- 
siderations do not  permit  a detailed examina- 
tion of these alternative approaches. 
Regardless  of  the  ratios  computed,  great 
care must  be  exercised  in  their  interpretation 
since several  biases could influence the results. 
The profitability figures on fixed rate loans, for 
example,  may  be severely depressed  if money 
market  rates  rise  sharply  or if  compensating 
balances  are  temporarily  reduced.  Similarly, 
when  interest  rates are rising,  banks  basing  a 
profitability  analysis  on  the  average  cost  of 
funds could understate the value of compensat- 
ing balances and the cost of acquiring addition- 
al loanable funds. For these reasons most banks 
do  not  place  great  emphasis  on  short-run 
changes  in  profitability,  preferring  instead  to 
examine  profitability  over  a  period  of  1  to 3 
years.  To  minimize  distortions  some  banks 
also  calculate  ratios  using  both  the  average 
and marginal costs of funds. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
In  the future, bank profitability is likely to 
depend  increasingly  on  the  differential  be- 
tween  loan  rates and  the cost  of  funds. Since 
customer  profitability  analysis  tends  to focus 
on  this  spread,  it  represents  an  innovative 
management  tool  for  commercial  banks.  By 
combining  numerous  aspects  of  a  customer 
relationship  into  a  single  analysis,  it  affords 
a  more  accurate  picture  of  customer  profit- 
ability  and  overcomes  some of  the limitations 
of  account  analysis.  Moreover,  it  can  also  be 
a valuable guide  in  the pricing of services and 
loans to a customer or for measuring the trade- 
off  between  fees  and  balances. 'For the pres- 
ent,  effective  use  of  customer  profitability 
analysis  is  probably  limited  to fewer  than  75 
banks, but an expansion could come quickly. 
While  the  profitability  analysis  provides 
banks with  a structural framework for  analyz-' 
ing a  total relationship, the analysis is always 
a direct reflection of the goals and priorities of 
management. As the survey  has  indicated,  no 
single  method  of  valuing  services  and  fund 
flows is  necessarily  correct.  Each  stage of  the 
analysis involves a number of  difficult choices, 
and  the  specific  options  selected  will  often 
have  a significant  influence  on  estimated  cus- 
tomer  profitability.  Customer  profitability 
analysis, therefore, can  be a valuable tool, but 
it can never be a substitute for sound manage- 
ment judgement. 
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